基于产品质量的供应链延保服务模式研究

Analysis of Supply Chain Extended Warranty Service Modes Based on Product Quality

基于产品质量对延保供应链的重要影响,将其作为内生变量,应用Stackelberg博弈方法,建立了无延保的基本模型、制造商提供延保的模型和零售商提供延保的模型,对各模型求解结果进行了对比分析。研究表明:供应链提供延保时产品质量和产品需求较无延保时高。零售商和制造商都可以从对方提供延保中"搭便车"获利。大部分情况下由零售商提供延保,产品质量、产品需求和延保需求更高。对零售商来说,制造商和零售商延保成本系数比、产品故障率和产品质量相关系数等决定了由哪一方提供延保更有利;对制造商来说,当其延保成本比零售商具有较大优势时自己提供延保更有利,否则,由零售商提供延保更有利。

Considering the important impact of product quality on supply chain extended warranty(EW),this paper takes the quality as an endogenous variable,and develops three Stackelberg game models,i.e.,model of no EW,model of EW provided by manufacturers and model of EW provided by retailers.The optimal solutions of each model are analyzed and compared.The research shows that:both the product quality levels and the product demands are higher when EW exists than when no EW exists.Both retailers and manufacturers can get more profits from each other’s EW.In most cases,EW provided by retailers can get higher product quality levels,product demands and EW demands.From the perspective of retailers,who is the favorable EW provider depends on the EW cost coefficient ratio between manufacturers and retailers,the correlation coefficient between the product failure rate and product quality,etc.From the perspective of manufacturers,it is optimal for manufacturers to offer EW by themselves when manufacturers’EW costs have a greater advantage than that of retailers.Otherwise,it is optimal for manufacturers to ask retailers to offer EW.