基于演化博弈的矿产资源开发管制策略研究——中央政府、地方政府、矿产企业

Study on Control Strategy of Mineral Resources Exploitation Based on Evolutionary Games——The Central Government,Local Governments and Mining Enterprises

在"绿水青山就是金山银山"这一理念的指引下,为了实现矿产资源开发的绿色发展,矿产资源开发过程的管制问题亟待解决。鉴于此,本文构建了中央政府、地方政府、矿产企业三方行为策略的演化博弈模型,分析了央地企三方在矿产资源开发过程中的策略选择,并通过数值仿真分析了央地企三方的演化路径及稳定策略。研究结果显示:中央政府是否采取"规制"策略主要取决于管理成本、形象声誉以及矿产企业带来的社会福利、矿产资源开发市场稳定和社会公正等因素;地方政府采取"积极管制"决策的主要影响因素是声誉成本、所在辖区矿产资源储量以及来自中央政府的惩戒等因素;矿产企业在采取"合规经营"策略时所考虑的因素包括收益及成本、矿产资源存储量央地两级政府的惩戒等。

Under the guidance of the concept of’Lucid waters and lush mountains invaluable assets.’,in order to realize the green development of mineral resources development,the control problem of mineral resources development process needs to be solved urgently.In view of this,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of the behavior strategies of the central government,local government and mineral enterprises.This paper analyzes the strategy choice of the three parties in the process of mineral resources development,and analyzes the evolution path and stability strategy of the three parties through numerical simulation.The results show that whether the central government adopts the’regulation’strategy mainly depends on the management cost,image and reputation,the social welfare brought by mineral enterprises,the stability of mineral resources development market and social justice and other factors.The main factors influencing local governments’decision to adopt active regulation are reputational costs,mineral reserves in their jurisdictions and disciplinary action from the central government.The factors that mineral enterprises take into consideration in adopting the strategy of’compliance operation’include income and cost,and punishment by the central and local governments of mineral resources storage and reserves.