财政权力配置对地方举债的影响研究

On the Influence of the Allocation of Fiscal Power on Local Public Debts

本文基于中国地级市市委书记兼任人大常委会主任这一重要制度事实,在发展型政府框架下讨论该政治实践对地方举债融资的影响,丰富了关于地方公共债务增长原因的制度研究,同时提供了观察地方政治与经济联系的一个窗口。研究发现,兼任制度为地方举债发展提供了制度环境:兼任制度统筹了地方财政决策权和监督权,增强了地方资源组织动员能力,表现为地方政府缓解增长压力和财政金融资源约束的能力增强,刺激地方融资平台有息债务增长。具体来说,正向刺激作用主要体现在市场化程度低的非标债务上,对市场化程度高的标准化城投债无显著影响。

Based on the fact that in China the CPC municipal committee secretary also concurrently holds the position of municipal congress chairperson,this article discusses the impact of such political practice on local debts and financing in developmental governments.It potentially enriches the study on the reasons for the increase of local public debt from an institutional perspective,and provides a window through which we can observe the connection between local politics and economic development.We find that the practice that the CPC municipal committee secretary concurrently holds the position of municipal congress chairperson has integrated the power to make local fiscal decisions and that of supervision,and strengthened the capability of organizing local resources.This is manifested by the local government’s increasing ability to reduce the developmental pressure and constraint of financial resources.This also leads to the increase of the interest-bearing debts of local financing platforms.To be more specific,the positive stimulus effect is mostly seen in non-standardized debts of lower degree of marketization instead of standardized municipal bonds of higher degree of marketization.