债务治理能否抑制控股股东的利益侵占行为

Can the Debt Governance Inhibit the Benefits Expropriation of Controlling Shareholder

在我国资本市场上,控股股东通过各种“掏空行为”侵占中小股东利益的现象非常普遍,第二类代理问题成为公司治理研究的核心。已有大量文献表明,债务治理效应可以有效减轻股东与管理层之间的第一类代理冲突。但是,债务对于控股股东与中小股东之间的第二类代理冲突是否有治理效应呢?本文以2007—2018年沪深上市公司发行的公司债为研究对象,实证检验债券契约条款的设置能否抑制控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占。研究发现,公司债中的债券契约条款设置得越严格,控股股东的掏空水平越低。在法制环境越好、审计质量越高以及控股股东股权越集中的情况下,债券契约条款对控股股东掏空行为的治理作用越显著。严格的债券契约条款可以有效抑制控股股东的利益侵占行为,对控股股东与中小股东之间的第二类代理冲突具有治理效应。

In China’s capital market,it is common for controlling shareholder to expropriate the benefits of small shareholders by tunneling behaviors.The second agency problem has become the core of corporate governance research.A large number of literatures have shown that debt governance can reduce the agency conflict between shareholders and managers.However,does debt have governance effect on the agency conflict between controlling shareholder and small shareholders?This paper empirically tests whether the setting of bond covenants can inhibit the benefits expropriation of controlling shareholder.Our results suggest that the stricter the bond covenants are,the lower the tunneling level of controlling shareholder is.In case of better legal environment,higher audit quality and more concentrated equity of controlling shareholder,the governance effect of bond covenants on the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders is more significant.The research conclusion shows that strict bond covenants can effectively reduce the benefits expropriation of controlling shareholder and have a governance effect on the second agency conflict between controlling shareholder and small shareholders.