审慎监管如何影响创投资本风险承担行为——基于流动性传导机制的检验

How does Prudential Regulation Affect Venture Capital Risk-taking Behavior——A Test of the Liquidity Transmission Mechanism

创投资本作为新创企业的融资渠道具有较强的政策敏感性,审慎监管从最终目标、中介指标两个层面对创投资本产生“双向”政策效应。本文利用2001~2020年创投资本(venture capital,VC)的投资案例数据,从监管政策的流动性传导视角出发,分析“穿透式监管”对创业投资规模、投资阶段的影响。研究发现:市场流动性充裕时监管套利更易发生这对VC投资规模造成挤出效应。在中介指标层面,“穿透式监管”政策的实施纠正了监管套利对VC的挤出效应,保留了股票流动性对VC早期投资的促进作用,激励创投资本的风险承担行为,形成正向影响;在最终目标层面,政策实施后VC投资阶段后移、投资规模降低,创投资本风险承担行为减少,形成负向影响。本文证明监管政策在传导过程中会产生异质性政策效应,为审慎监管政策传导研究补充了实证证据。

Venture capital is not only the main financing channel of SMEs but also one of the key points of systemic risk prevention.Prudential supervision has a"two-way"policy effect on venture capital from the two levels of ultimate goal sand intermediary index.Based on the investment data of venture funds(hereinafter referred to as"VC")from 2001 to 2020,this paper analyzes the impact of"penetrating supervision"on venture capital scale and investment stage from the perspective of liquidity transmission of regulatory policies.The result shows that there is a certain amount of regulatory arbitrage between credit market and stock market,so market liquidity itself has a crowding out effect on VC investment scale.Based on intermediary indicators,the implementation of"penetrating supervision"policy corrects the crowding out effect of regulatory arbitrage on VC,retains the promotion effect of stock liquidity on VC’s early investment,and has a positive impact on venture capital risk-taking.At the final goal level,the VC investment stage moves later and the investment scale decreases after the implementation of the policy,which reduces the venture capital risk-taking preference and forms a negative impact.This paper proves that regulatory policies produce heterogeneous policy effects in the transmission process,which provides empirical evidence for prudential regulatory policy transmission research.