人民公社制度、行为倾向演化与合作效率——基于强互惠理论的再考察

People’s Commune System,Behavioral Tendency Evolution and Cooperative Efficiency——Re-examination Based on the Theory of Strong Reciprocity

农村合作社制度的设计初衷是提升农业生产效率,但发展到人民公社时期,不仅没有产生合作剩余,反而出现了农业产出的大幅度下降。从新制度经济学的视角,产权不明晰、激励机制扭曲、监督成本高昂和缺乏退社权等是造成人民公社效率低下的主要原因,这一制度和产权解释被广泛认可。本文引入桑塔费学派的"强互惠理论"对人民公社制度进行再考察发现,这一制度设计不仅缺乏有效的第三方惩罚机制,也使得具有强互惠倾向的个体无法对卸责者实施惩罚,从而导致了一种惩罚真空的现象,进而使得群体的合作水平断崖式下降。本文通过构建博弈模型进一步验证了这一结论。最后指出,制度设计必须遵循人类在长期演化过程中形成的特定心理机制和行为倾向(偏好),否则再好的制度设计意图可能都会带来相反的结果。

The original intention of the rural cooperative system was to improve the efficiency of agricultural production.However,when it developed into the people’s commune,not only did it not produce cooperative surplus,but instead experienced a substantial decline in agricultural output.From the perspective of new institutional economics,unclear property rights,distortion of incentive mechanisms,high supervision costs,and lack of resignation rights are the main reasons for the low efficiency of people’s communes.This system and property rights interpretation are widely recognized.Introducing the"strong reciprocity theory"of the Santafeschool to re-examine the people’s commune system and found that this system design not only lacks an effective third-party punishment mechanism,but also makes it impossible for individuals with strong reciprocal tendencies to punish those who disqualify them.A phenomenon of a penalty vacuum has led to a cliff-like decline in the level of group cooperation.This conclusion is further verified by constructing a game model.Finally,it is pointed out that institutional design must follow the specific psychological mechanisms and behavioral tendencies(preferences)formed by human beings in the long-term evolution process,otherwise no matter how good institutional design intentions are,the opposite result may be brought about.