研发补贴对企业信用评级的信号效应——产品市场竞争的调节作用

Signal Effect of R&D Subsidies on Firm Credit Ratings——Moderating Effect of Product Market Competition

本文首先基于信号理论分析得出企业获得研发补贴所具有的不同信号类型将对企业信用等级产生正反两方面的影响。为了研究不同类型的信号对该企业信用等级产生的净效应究竟是提升还是降低,本文利用2009至2017年我国A股上市公司的经验数据,构建多元线性回归模型进行实证检验,而且分别采用Ordered Probit模型、Ordered Logit模型和工具变量等方法进行稳健测试。实证研究结果一致表明,就总体而言,企业获得的研发补贴强度与企业信用评级显著负相关。由于企业所处的产品市场竞争情况(或垄断情况)是影响企业创新行为的关键性因素,因而本文进一步探究产品市场竞争程度对政府研发补贴的信号效应所起的调节作用。其实证结论发现,与企业所处的较高产品市场竞争程度相比,较高程度的产品市场垄断(即企业所处的产品市场竞争程度较小)显著地促进了政府研发补贴对企业信用评级的提升作用。

Based on the perspective of signal theory, this paper firstly analyzes the positive and negative effects of different signal types of R&D subsidies on enterprise credit rating. In order to empirically test the net effect of R&D subsidies on the credit rating of the enterprise, this paper uses the empirical data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2017, and construct multiple linear regression model for empirical research. Moreover, the Ordered Probit model, Ordered Logit model and tool variable were used to carry out a number of robust tests. The empirical results consistently show that the intensity of government R&D subsidies received by enterprises is significantly negatively correlated with enterprise credit rating. Due to the enterprise’s product market competition(or the degree of monopoly) is the decisive factors influencing the enterprise innovation behavior, thus this paper further discusses the moderating effect of product market competition on the economic consequences of government R&D subsidies, and carries out empirical research with the methods of interaction terms and grouping test respectively. The paper finds that compared with the higher degree of product market competition, the higher degree of product market monopoly(the lower degree of product market competition) significantly promotes the role of government R&D subsidies in improving the credit rating of enterprises.