混合所有制、董事会效率与企业非效率投资

Mixed Ownership, Board Efficiency and Inefficient Investment

混合所有制改革进入深化阶段,异质产权的加入是否改善董事会效率,进而抑制企业的非理性投资行为具有一定的研究价值。本文构建了"混合所有制→董事会效率→非效率投资"的作用机理模型,选取2013—2017年实际控制人为国有产权的企业作为样本,研究结果表明:(1)混合主体深入性和制衡度的程度加深,抑制了企业非理性投资行为,尤其是投资过度行为有明显抑制作用;(2)董事会效率在混合所有制与非效率投资间存在中介效应。

With the deepening of the mixed ownership reform,it is of great value to study whether the introduction of heterogeneous property rights can improve the efficiency of the board of directors and further inhibit the irrational investment behavior of enterprises.This paper constructs a mechanism model of"mixed ownership→board efficiency→inefficient investment",and selects the enterprises whose actual controllers are state-owned property rights from 2013 to 2017 as samples.The results show that:(1)the deepening of the hybrid subject and the degree of balance are deepened,which inhibits the irrational investment behavior of the enterprise;especially the excessive investment behavior;(2)board efficiency has a mediating effect between mixed ownership and non-efficiency investment.