财政层级改革、政府间金融分权与地区间政府融资差距——地方政府融资平台债务的经验证据

Fiscal Hierarchical Reform,Intergovernmental Financial Decentralization and Regional Government Financing Disparity:Evidence from Debt of Local Government Financing Vehicles

除政府间财政关系外,政府间金融关系亦为我国经济体制的关键环节并深刻影响着从中央到地方各级政府的行为,金融资源的地区间配置对地区协调发展构成重要影响。在金融分权背景下,不同地区的政府融资能力有何差异?既有理论和经验证据尚无一致的答案。为厘清上述争论,本文利用省直接管理县财政改革构建双重差分模型,基于2006—2015年地级市融资平台债务数据发现,面对财力冲击时,经济基础好、财政实力强的地方政府新增举债融资规模较大,借助金融分权渠道获得更多的资金支持;而财政经济基础薄弱的地方政府新增融资规模较小,落于下风,扩大了金融资源配置的地区间差距。机制分析表明,较发达地区基于自身雄厚的财经实力产生的“先发优势”占据主导地位,成为导致地区间政府融资差距扩张的主要机制,而欠发达地区基于赶超晋位压力产生的举债冲动受自身融资能力约束无法得到充分释放,“后发赶超”的主观意愿无法转变为客观现实。本文阐明了央地关系变革中地区差距扩张的一种作用机制。

Intergovernmental fiscal and finance relations have a deep impact on characteristics of China’s economy and the behavior of local government at all levels.This paper wants to figure out the basic logic for the allocation of financial resources among regions under the implicit financial decentralization.Based on local government financing vehicles’(LGFV)debt data and by exploiting“Province Managing County”(PMC)reform as a policy shock to construct a DID framework,this study find that city governments with better economic and fiscal status can gain more funds through bank loans and municipal bonds when facing PMC reform,whereas the less developed ones are less capable to utilize the new opportunity,thus widening the regional gap of local government financing.Mechanism analysis implicates that city’s economic and fiscal status are the deciding force of the above procedure.However,the catching-up pressures and developing incentives of less developed regions can’t be realized in reality.This study argue that this might be an explanation for the expansion of regional disparity along with the reform of China’s central-local relationship.