摘要
本文将"经济政治人"假设嵌入分权约束下官员晋升假说的理论框架,剖析在分权衍生的有偏政治激励下发展型政府对房价与产业结构的激励约束机制,以及房价影响产业结构升级的经济机理。使用2005—2017年286个城市的面板数据,通过空间杜宾模型、面板门槛模型和多重中介效应模型进行验证。研究发现:房价上涨通过"消费抑制效应""投资扭曲效应""劳动力挤出效应"阻碍了本地和邻域的产业结构升级,但推动了邻域产业内部升级及其服务化;产业结构升级呈现趋同性空间联动,且晋升竞争强化了产业结构升级的跨域互动;房价上涨对产业结构升级的影响随分权度提高呈现由促进到抑制的单门槛效应。究其根源,是我国分权型体制激励地方官员内生出推动房价上涨与产业结构升级的"替代性"偏好冲突。
This paper embed the hypothesis of"economic and political man"into the theoretical framework of official promotion hypothesis under decentralization constraints,and analyzed the incentive and restraint mechanisms of development government on housing price and industrial structure upgrading under the partial political incentive derived from decentralization,as well as the economic mechanism of housing price affecting industrial structure upgrading.Using the panel data of 286 cities from 2005 to 2017,it was validated by spatial Dubin model,panel threshold model and multiple mediation effect model.The study found that rising housing price had hindered local and neighborhood industrial structure upgrading through"consumption inhibition effect","investment distortion effect"and"labor extrusion effect",but it had promoted industrial internal upgrading and its servicing in neighbourhood.Besides,industrial structure upgrading presented convergence spatial linkage,and promotion competition strengthened the cross-domain interaction.In addition,the impact of rising housing price on industrial structure upgrading had a single threshold effect,which reflected in the change from improvement to inhibition caused by rising level of decentralization.The root cause of the findings lay in China’s decentralized system,which had created the endogenous"alternative"preference conflict of local officials between pushing housing price and promoting industrial structure upgrading.
作者
孙超
石绍宾
唐云锋
SUN Chao;SHI Shao-bin;TANG Yun-feng(School of Economics,Shandong University,Jinan 250010;School of Finance and Taxation,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018;School of International Finance and Trade,Zhejiang Yuexiu School of International Studies,Shaoxing 312069,China)
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第10期68-82,共15页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(16BJY151)
国家社会科学基金项目(18BJY209)
浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY20G030014)
关键词
中国式分权
房价波动
产业结构升级
晋升激励
地方政府竞争
Chinese decentralization
housing price fluctuation
industrial structure upgrading
promotion incentive
local government competition