《尼各马可伦理学》中两种“属人的善”

Two Accounts of Eudaimonia in the Nicomachean EthicsTwo Accounts of Eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics

在《尼各马可伦理学》中,亚里士多德定义了两种“最高善”:一为沉思生活,一为道德德性与实践智慧的完满实现。本文试图论证,因为后者对前者的实现有着必要作用,故在衍生的意义上具有可欲性。对此的讨论或许有助于澄清“美德”概念在亚里士多德伦理学中的地位:无论选择何种“最高善”的定义,它都只在衍生的意义上可欲,而并非亚氏伦理学中的核心与始点。

In the Nicomachean Ethics,Aristotle defined two accounts of eudaimoni a,one is the contemplative life,and the other is the complete realization of moral virtue and practical wisdom.This article attempts to argue that because the latter is necessary to the realization of the former,it is desirable only in a derived sense.This argument may help to clarify the status of moral virtue in Aristotle's ethics:whatever definition of eudaimonia is chosen,the moral virtue is only derivatively desirable,but not the core and starting point of Aristotle's ethics.