高管联结与隧道行为:促进还是抑制?

Executives’ Ties and Tunneling Behavior:Promotion or Inhibition?

如何防止第二类代理问题,保护中小股东的合法权益,始终是完善公司治理的核心和关键。本文采用上市公司的经验数据,对母子公司高管联结与隧道行为的关系进行实证研究,结果显示:高管联结作为一种治理机制,能够有效弱化治理过程中的隧道行为。同时,文章还检验了母公司持股和企业集团产权性质在上述关系中的权变作用,发现母公司持股在高管联结与隧道行为关系中具有调节效应,具体表现是:当母公司持股比例较低时,母子公司高管联结对隧道行为的影响更强;企业集团产权性质的调节作用未通过显著性检验。以上结论表明高管联结形成的双重身份高管具有独特的人力资本属性,有利于提升母子公司治理水平。

How to prevent the second type of agency problem and protect the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium shareholders is always the core and key point to perfect corporate governance.In this paper,the authors use the empirical data of listed companies to make empirically test of the relationship between parent-subsidiary executives’ties and tunnel behavior.The results show that:as a governance mechanism,executives’ties can weaken the tunnel behavior in the governance process.At the same time,in this paper,the authors also examine the contingency role of the parent company’s shareholding and the property rights of the enterprise group in the above relationship.It is found that the parent company’s shareholding has a regulating role in the relationship between the executives’ties and the tunnel behavior.The specific performance is:when the parent company’s shareholding is low,the influence of parent-subsidiary executives’ties on tunnel behavior is stronger.However,the moderating effect of the property rights of enterprise groups is not significant,that is,the influence of parent-subsidiary executives’ties on tunnel behavior is not significantly different between private enterprise groups and stateowned enterprise groups.The above conclusions show that the dual identity executives formed by executives’ties have unique human capital attributes,which is conducive to improving the governance level of parent subsidiary companies.