官员更替、政府代理问题与企业投资:来自中国私营企业的证据

Political Turnover,Government Agency Problem,and Firm Investment:Evidence from Chinese Privately Owned Enterprises

已有研究发现,官员更替引发的政治不确定性会降低企业的投资动机。这一现象势必是新任官员不愿看到的。那么,新任官员是否会采取行动来应对这一影响?本文试图从政府代理问题的视角部分回答这一问题。采用中国私营企业调查数据,以政府向企业收取的非合规性费用作为政府代理问题的度量指标,本文发现:在官员更替年份,政府代理问题会得到显著缓解,这说明新任官员有动机通过减少政府代理问题,向企业发放积极信号,以降低官员更替期间的政治不确定性。进一步研究发现,官员更替对政府代理问题的抑制作用,在经济增长压力越大、辖区内企业的政治风险敏感度越高以及历史的政府代理问题越严重的地区越显著。但是,官员更替对政府代理问题的影响在企业层面不存在异质性,这意味着政府代理问题的减少是普遍性的。最后,新任官员减少政府代理问题的行为显著弱化了官员更替对企业投资的负面影响,这意味着新任官员的努力确实产生了积极效果。本文的结论有助于我们理解官员更替期间的政府决策及其对企业行为的影响。

Current research documents that political turnover depresses firms’incentive of investment through inviting political uncertainty.This phenomenon must be unwilling for new officials.Then,a natural question is that how succeed official deals with this problem.This paper aims to answer this question from the perspective of government agency problem.Using the survey data of Chinese privately owned enterprises(POEs),we use the government levies as the measure of government agency problem.Empirical results show that the POEs experience a significantly decrease in government agency problem during the political turnover.In addition,such an effect is concentrated in regions where economic growth pressure is greater,firms’political risk sensitivity is higher and historical government agency problem is more serious.However,the effect of political turnover on government agency problem is homogeneity in the firm level,indicating that the decreasing of government levies is general.Finally,the decrease of government agency problem during the political turnover significantly weakens the negative impact of political turnover on firm investment,which means the efforts of the new officials have indeed had a positive effect.The conclusions of this paper help us understand government decisions during political turnover and their impact on firm behavior.