双重偶然性与信号博弈中的相互误解

Double Contingency and Mutual Misunderstanding in Signaling Games

双重偶然性是帕森斯与卢曼讨论社会秩序产生的出发点,但两人对此的理解却并不相同。这两种理解与刘易斯和斯凯姆斯对信号博弈的两条研究进路是平行的。利用信号博弈构建的相互误解情景表明,社会秩序并不是帕森斯所认为的互补的期望来实现的,而是由通信来实现的,因此支持卢曼的理解。

Both Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann start their explanation of social order from double contingency while their understandings are different.The difference between them parallels to the difference between David Lewis’and Brian Skyrms’approach to signaling games.We find that social order is not guaranteed by complementary expectation through a scenario of mutual misunderstanding.On the contrary,it is realized through communication,as Luhmann has argued.