职工董事影响企业投资效率吗——基于中国资本市场的经验证据

Does Employee Representation Affect Corporate Investment Efficiency?——Empirical Evidence from China’s Capital Market

本文从企业投资效率角度首次对我国职工董事制度的经济后果进行实证研究,即基于中国资本市场实证检验上市公司设置职工董事与其投资效率的关系,同时考察企业产权性质和产品市场竞争程度对两者关系的影响。结果发现:职工董事可以有效提高上市公司投资效率,而且这种关系在国有控股企业和处于低产品市场竞争环境中的企业更加显著。本文进一步研究发现:职工董事不仅可以抑制企业过度投资,而且可以缓解企业投资不足;职工董事能够有效抑制国有控股企业的过度投资行为,并缓解了非国有控股企业的投资不足;职工董事在竞争不激烈的产品市场中主要可以抑制过度投资,而在竞争激烈的产品市场中则可以缓解投资不足。

This paper is the first empirical study of the economic consequences of the adoption of the employee director system in China from the perspective of the investment efficiency of enterprises,that is,based on empirical study of China’s capital market in order to test the relationship between employee directors and the investment efficiency of listed companies.The impact of the nature of enterprise property rights and the degree of product market competition on this relationship is also discussed.The results show that employee directors can improve the investment efficiency of listed companies effectively,and this relationship is more significant for state-owned enterprises and enterprises in product markets with low levels of competition.Further research shows that employee directors can restrain not only overinvestment but can also reduce underinvestment.Employee directors can restrain the overinvestment behaviour of state-owned enterprises effectively and reduce underinvestment by non-state-owned enterprises.In product markets with low levels of competition,employee directors can restrain overinvestment,while in product markets with high levels of competition,employee directors can reduce underinvestment.