混合所有制改革有助于提升国有企业投资效率吗?

Does the Mixed Ownership Reform of State-owned Enterprises Enhance Investment Efficiency?

混合所有制改革是新时期全面深化国有企业改革的重点内容。国有企业通过混合所有制改革引入非国有资本,既能因预算约束硬化而强化融资约束,又可通过形成股权主体多元和融合的股权结构而改善公司治理,尤其是对企业投资形成有效约束。本文基于2003—2017年中国沪深交易所国有上市公司前10大股东的股权性质和持股比例数据,从"质"与"量"的双重视角考察了国有企业混合所有制改革对企业投资效率的影响效应和作用机制。研究发现:从影响结果来看,国有企业混合所有制改革对企业投资效率存在显著的提升效应;从影响程度来看,国有企业通过混合所有制改革所产生的股权主体多样性和融合度(制衡度)对提升企业投资效率也存在显著的促进作用;从作用机理来看,国有企业混合所有制改革对企业投资效率的提升机理主要在于公司治理水平的改善,而非融资约束的强化。上述研究发现对新时期国有企业进一步推进混合所有制改革以完善公司治理水平和提升企业投资效率提供了经验借鉴。

The inefficient investment formed by over investment and under investment of state-owned enterprises is an important manifestation of the low efficiency of state-owned enterprises.The possible reasons lie in the absence of owners,ineffective supervision and soft budget constraints.Therefore,how to improve the management system of state-owned assets,improve the governance structure of state-owned enterprises and promote the transformation of operation mechanism of state-owned enterprises have become the focus of comprehensive deepening reform of state-owned enterprises in the new period.The mixed ownership reform is an important breakthrough in comprehensive deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises.Its goal is to optimize corporate governance and improve the efficiency of resource allocation,which will have an important impact on the enterprises investment efficiency.On the one hand,state-owned enterprises will improve the corporate governance level through the introduction of heterogeneous shareholders of non-state-owned capital to form a multiple-balanced ownership structure and shareholder relations,thereby affecting the enterprises investment efficiency;On the other hand,the changes of governance structure brought about by the mixed ownership reform will help to harden the budget constraints and optimize the resource allocation of state-owned enterprises,thereby affecting the enterprises investment efficiency.Therefore,it is an important subject to investigate the effect and mechanism of state-owned enterprises mixed ownership reform on the enterprises investment efficiency.Based on the data on the nature and shareholding ratio of the top 10 largest shareholders of state-owned listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2017 in China,this paper attempts to explore the following questions:(1)What is the relationship between the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises(mixed ownership reform or not)and the enterprises investment efficiency?(2)What is the mechanism of the mixed ownership reform affecting the state-owned enterprises investment efficiency?Is the financing constraint hardened or the principal-agent problem alleviated?(3)What is the relationship between the diversity and integration of heterogeneous shareholders in state-owned enterprises(mixed ownership reform degree)and the enterprises investment efficiency?The main contributions of this paper are as follows:(1)This paper examines whether the mixed ownership reform can help improve the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises from the dual perspectives of"quality"(mixed ownership reform or not)and"quantity"(mixed ownership reform degree),and enriches the research on the effects of mixed ownership reform.(2)From the perspective of enterprises investment efficiency,this paper examines whether the corporate governance effect and financing constraint effect brought about by the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises are the mechanism that leads to different economic consequences of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,and provides theoretical reference and empirical evidence support for the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises to improve the corporate governance level and optimize the resource allocation.(3)While revealing the mechanism of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises affecting the enterprises investment efficiency,this paper further examines the impact of the diversity and integration of heterogeneous shareholders on enterprise investment behavior,and broadens the research on the relationship between property rights structure arrangements and enterprise behavior choices,Which also enriches the research on the influencing factors of the enterprises investment efficiency.This research not only has certain policy reference value for further promoting the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in the new period,but also provides experience and reference for state-owned enterprises to improve corporate governance and improve investment efficiency through mixed ownership reform to promote high-quality development.At the same time,the research conclusions of this paper also show that in the process of mixed ownership reform,state-owned enterprises should not only realize the"mixing"at the level of ownership structure,but also realize the"mixing"at the level of governance structure,so as to give full play to the governance effect of checks and balances and supervision of non-state-owned shareholders.