高管薪酬黏性与企业避税:促进或抑制

Executive Compensation Stickiness and Corporate Tax Avoidance:“Promotion”or“Suppression”

高管薪酬黏性作为一种制度安排具有双重特征,对企业委托代理关系和企业行为均产生了深远影响。文章尝试从避税角度分析高管薪酬黏性的双重效应,以2008~2019年A股上市公司为样本进行实证检验。结果表明:高管薪酬黏性降低了企业避税程度。检验其影响机制发现,高管薪酬黏性通过缓解企业委托代理关系,降低了代理成本,进而抑制了企业避税,即高管薪酬黏性发挥了激励效应。进一步证据显示,高管薪酬黏性仅在经营业绩较差的企业、非国有企业及业绩下降时适度奖励高管的企业中发挥了激励效应。文章的结论有助于厘清高管薪酬黏性对企业的潜在影响,对企业进一步优化薪酬激励制度具有借鉴意义,并为避税代理观的合理性提供了现实证据。

As an institutional arrangement,the executive compensation stickiness has dual characteristics,which has a profound impact on the principal-agent relationship of the enterprise and enterprise behavior.This paper attempts to analyze the dual effect of executive compensation stickiness from the perspective of tax avoidance and take the listed companies of China’s A-share from 2008 to 2019 as the sample for empirical test.The research finds that:the executive compensation stickiness reduces the degree of tax avoidance of enterprises.The specific examination of the impact mechanism shows that executive compensation stickiness alleviates the principal-agent relationship,reduces the agency cost,and then restrains the tax avoidance of enterprises,that is,executive compensation stickiness exerts an incentive effect.Further study finds that executive compensation stickiness only exerts an incentive effect in enterprises with poor performance,non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises that moderately reward executives when their performance decline.The findings of this paper are helpful for enterprises to clarify the potential impact of executive compensation stickiness on them,and have reference significance for enterprises to further optimize the compensation incentive system.They also provides practical evidence for the rationality of agency perspective of tax avoidance.