地方政府的环境行为与居民幸福感

Environmental Behavior of Local Government and Subject Well-being

本文匹配中国综合社会调查数据与地级市层面的环境数据,运用有序Logit模型等,实证检验地方政府的环境污染容忍和治理努力对居民幸福感的影响,并运用可乘交互效应模型,检验晋升和财税收入双重激励机制的调节效应。研究发现:地方政府的环境污染容忍显著降低了居民幸福感,环境治理努力与居民幸福感呈现倒“U”型关系,且环境治理工具的幸福效应迥异不同;异质性检验发现,中部地区与低收入群体的幸福感变动对污染容忍较为敏感,而东部地区和高收入群体对治理努力更为敏感;晋升激励负向调节污染容忍对居民幸福感的直接影响,财税收入激励正向调节治理努力对居民幸福感的直接影响。使用工具变量缓解内生性问题及其他一系列稳健性检验后,以上结论依然稳健。

The paper analyses the empirical research of the influence of the local government’s environmental behavior on the residents’subject well-being,and the moderating effects of political promotion and fiscal incentives based on the CGSS 2003-2013 using the ordered logit model and multiplicative interaction models respectively.The results show that:the environmental degradation tolerance of local governments significantly go against residents’subject well-being,but there are"inverted U-shaped"relationships between the environmental governance and residents’subject well-being.Analysis on heterogeneity show that:the changes of subject well-being of the central regions and low-income groups are more sensitive to degradation tolerance,but the eastern regions and high-income groups are more sensitive to environmental governance efforts.Political promotion incentive negatively moderates the relationship of between environmental degradation tolerance and subject well-being,and fiscal incentive positively moderates the relationship of between environmental governance efforts and subject well-being.Finally,we introduce instrumental variable to alleviate endogenous problems and a series of other methods to test the robustness of the above conclusions,and the conclusions are still robust.