财务宽裕会助推并购吗

Will Financial Excesses Help M&A?

并购作为上市公司对外扩张的一种主要方式,一直都受到了学术界和实务界的广泛关注。本文选取的样本为2009-2018年我国A股财务宽裕上市公司,试图探索财务宽裕程度对并购行为会产生何种影响。研究结果表明:财务宽裕与并购行为呈显著负向关系。其中,财务宽裕程度越高,公司并购金额越少、并购频率越低,但是财务宽裕与并购类型的选择没有显著相关性。进一步发现,高管持股会加强财务宽裕对并购行为的抑制作用;并且,相比于产品市场竞争激烈的公司,产品市场集中度高的财务宽裕公司对并购行为的抑制作用更明显。同时考虑高管持股和产品市场竞争的机制后发现,在产品市场集中度高的行业中,高管持股对财务宽裕公司的并购行为具有更明显的负向影响。

As a main way for listed companies to expand abroad,M&A has been widely concerned by academia and practitioners.This paper takes 2009-2018 A-share financial excesses listed companies as a sample to empirically test the impact of financial excesses on M&A behavior.The results show that there is a significant negative relationship between financial excesses and M&A behavior.Among them,the higher the degree of financial excesses,the less the amount of M&A and the lower the frequency of M&A,but there is no significant correlation between financial excesses and the type of M&A.It is further found that executive shareholding will strengthen the inhibition of financial excesses on M&A behavior;and compared with the companies with fierce product market competition the frnancial excesses companies with high product market concentration have more obvious inhibition on M&A behavior.At the same time,considering the mechanism of executive shareholding and product market competition,we find that executive shareholding has a more significant negative impact on the M&A behavior of financial excesses companies in industries with high concentration of product market.The research of this paper can be used for reference to understand the M&A behavior.