EVA考核与国有资本调整的制度冲突

The Institutional Conflict between EVA Evaluation and Adjustment of State-owned Capital

推动国有资本调整和实施EVA考核是加快国有经济布局调整、引导中央企业转变发展方式的重要制度安排,关系到提升国有企业效率、推动国有经济改革的大局。本文以2007—2010年央企控股上市公司为样本,从股权集中度和股权制衡两个角度研究了国有资本调整对EVA的影响,探讨了两者的制度效应。研究表明:在重要领域提高国有资本集中度、实现绝对控制与EVA考核制度效应不同,存在制度冲突;在一般领域国有资本保持必要影响力与EVA考核制度效应相同,不存在制度冲突。在此基础上对改进EVA考核、完善中央企业治理结构提出政策建议,以期对国有经济改革和EVA考核起到一定的参考作用。

The adjusting state-owned capital and EVA evaluation is an important institutional arrangement to optimize state-owned economy structure and position with a view to guiding the central enterprises' transformation of the pattern of economic development.The issue matters to the overall situation of improving state economic efficiency,promoting the reform of state-owned economy.In this paper,an empirical analysis was given on the relationship in adjusting state-owned capital and EVA,from the concentration of ownership to the ownership structure balance,based on the key and common trade samples of the listed companies of central enterprises during the period of 2007-2009,and its systematic effect.The empirical results show that there is not the same system effect in the course of accelerating the state-owned capitalism,maintaining the absolute controlling force and EVA evaluation in the above trades,there is a conflict between them;but there is no conflict in common trades for maintaining state-owned capital necessary to influence and EVA.In addition,we make policy recommendations and raise further perfection measures on corporate governance for central enterprises;The research may be useful in the reform of state-owned enterprises in China.