考虑碳税征收的供应链纵向减排博弈研究

Research on Game of Vertical Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chain with Emission Tax

在低碳经济背景下引入碳排放税及消费者低碳偏好,对供应商主导的二级供应链减排博弈展开研究;进而通过逆向归纳法求得序贯行动的精炼子博弈纳什均衡,并采用数值实验展开分析。研究表明,在外生碳税下供应商和制造商都将采取减排策略,可求得最优产量与单位产品减排量,但征收碳税并不一定能够保证碳排放总量的降低;供应链中一方的减排行为将激励另一方增加单位产品减排量;企业减排成本系数越低,征收碳税对控制碳排放总量的效果越明显。

In the context of the low-carbon economy,the paper researches the game of vertical emission reduction with emission tax and consumer low-carbon preferences in the supplier-led two-stage supply chain.The backward induction method is used to get the refining sub-game Nash equilibrium and numerical experiment is adopted to make further analysis.The results show that the carbon emission tax can incentive suppliers and manufacturers to reduce emissions and obtain optimal production and unit product emission reduction,however,the carbon emission tax has no access to guarantee the reduction of total carbon emission.One in the supply chain reduce emission can encourage the other to increase the emission reduction.And the lower the emission reduction cost coefficient is,the better carbon emission tax can control the total carbon emission.