地区差距、要素流动与财政分权

Interregional Disparity, Factor Mobility, and Fiscal Decentralization

本文在财政分权框架下引入不完全人口流动和内生劳动供给选择 ,针对两个不对称的地方经济 ,研究了政府的最优税收、最优公共支出和最优转移支付政策。我们发现了零中央政府收入税和逆向财政缺口 ,在有限政策工具的约束下 ,对应性转移支付也具有缩小区域差距的功能。不同级别政府间的服务竞争和税收竞争极大地影响了个人和政府的最优决策 ,拥挤效应和实际禀赋效应放大了通常意义上的收入效应水平。人口流动和财政分权提高了低生产力地区的福利 ,数值模拟分析结果表明高生产力、高禀赋地区对低生产力、低禀赋地区存在隐性的区域间收入再分配 ,中央政府的干预措施一般具有协调区域发展、补贴低生产力低禀赋地区的性质。结合我国东西部的经济现实 ,我们认为中央政府应该打破已有的利益分配格局 ,优化转移支付资金的结构 。

This paper studies the optimal taxation, expenditures and grants polices in a federal framework with mobile population and endogenous labor choices. In addition to the zero federal income tax and negative fiscal gap, we find the taxation competition and service competition in different levels of governments largely influence the optimal governmental and individual choices. With some policy instrument constraints, the matching grants not only meet the individual needs and balance government finance, but also correct the horizontal and vertical distortions. We also consider the relations between fiscal decentralization and interregional disparity. The congestion effect and real endowment effect magnify the usual income effect and give some interesting comparative static analysis about the fiscal policies and various parameters. The central intervention and labor mobility increase the welfare of the regions with low technology and low endowment where implicit interregional redistribution plays an important role.