期刊文献+

当量电价自动抑制厂商不良持留行为的自律新机制 被引量:7

ELECTRCITY VALUE EQUIVALENT PRICING METHOD'S INTERNAL AUTONOMY MECHANISM TO RESTRAIN MARKET POWER
下载PDF
导出
摘要 持留发电容量(囤积居奇)获利是发电厂商行使市场力的最常用手段,由于极具隐蔽性,其危害也最大。在统一出清和两部制电价下,发电厂商从自身利益出发会采取持留容量策略;在PAB电价下,发电厂商可先持留容量造成供应紧张,然后通过报高价获利。在上述传统定价机制下,只能采用外置的补救性措施来抑制市场力,无法从根本上解决问题。实用当量电价为抑制市场力提供了全新的机制,使抑制市场力措施在定价机制中内部自律化。作者首次分析了实用当量电价下,发电厂商拥有多个发电单元的持留容量行为(发电厂商勾结的情况与此类似);结果表明,即使在这种情况下发电厂商仍没有持留容量的利益驱动,体现了当量电价抑制市场力的内在自律新机制。 Generation capacity withholding is the most usual approach for a power supplier to exercise his market power. It is more dangerous to the market because it is hidden from view of the market regulation. Under either uniform clearing or two-part tariffs pricing methods, suppliers often withhold generation capacity to maximize their profits. Under PAB (pay as bid) pricing method, power suppliers withhold generation capacity to result in power shortage in the market, and then make profits by bidding high price. So the exterior remedial methods have always to be used in the market to restrain power suppliers' market power under those traditional pricing methods. However, all these exterior mitigation methods cannot solve the problem thoroughly. Electricity Value Equivalent (EVE) pricing method is proved to present an internal autonomy mechanism to restrain market power. In this paper the action of capacity withholding by the power supplier with several units is analyzed, which is similar to the collusion of power suppliers. It is proved that there is no incentive for power suppliers to withhold capacity, implying that EVE pricing method has internal autonomy mechanism to restrain market power.
出处 《电网技术》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2004年第11期1-6,共6页 Power System Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(59937150)
关键词 电力工业 电力市场 当量电价 生产效率 电力供应 自律机制 Electric power systems Industrial economics Industrial management Problem solving
  • 引文网络
  • 相关文献

参考文献8

二级参考文献29

  • 1言茂松.电能价值分析与分时电价预测--电力市场的定价理论与方法(Electricity Value Equivalent & Time-of-Day Electricity Pric[M].北京:中国电力出版社,1997..
  • 2[2]David A K,Wen Fushuan. Market Power in Electricity Supply. IEEE Trans on Energy Conversion,2001,16(4):352~360
  • 3[4]Hao Shangyou. A Study of Basic Bidding Strategy in Clearing Pricing Auctions. IEEE Trans on Power Systems,2000,15(3):975~980
  • 4[6]Mcafee P,Mcmillan J. Auctions and Bidding. Journal of Economic Literature,1987,25(1):699~738
  • 5[7]Bower J,Bunn D. Experimental Analysis of the Efficiency of Uniform-price Versus Discriminatory Auctions in the England and Wales Electricity Market. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control,2001,25:561~592
  • 6Ford A. Waiting for the Boom.. A Simulation Study of Power Plant Construction in California. Energy Policy, 2001(29)847-869.
  • 7Vazquez C, Rivier M, Perez-Arriaga I J. A Market Approach to Long-term Security of Supply. IEEE Trans on Power Systems,2002, 17(2): 349-357.
  • 8Hirst Eric, Hadley Stan. Generation Adequacy: Who Decides?The Electricity Journal, 1999, 12(10): 11-21.
  • 9Stoft Steven. PJM's Capacity Market in a Price-Spike World.PWP-077.
  • 10言茂松(Yan Maosong). 当量电价与融资重组.(Electricity Value Equivalent Pricing and Restructuring). 北京:中国电力出版社(Beijing:Chinese Electric Power Press),2000.

共引文献208

同被引文献62

引证文献7

二级引证文献25

;
使用帮助 返回顶部