建设项目委托代理关系的经济学分析及激励与约束机制设计

Economic Analysis: Incentive and Constraint Mechanism for Construction Project Principal-Agents

建设项目业主与承包商之间的经济关系集中反映在信息的不对称性与契约的不完备性,二者之间具有严格经济学意义上的委托代理关系。通过建立委托代理关系模型,借鉴现代企业制度的分析方法,分析建设项目委托代理关系运行规律和基本特征,有利于帮助我们认识和分析建设项目管理中的重大问题,特别是建设项目激励与约束机制设计。

The owner and contractor of a construction project, more often than not, find their economic ties in an asymmetric information supply, or in an imperfectly assigned contract. This paper creates a principal-agent model to analyze agents' basic behaviors and agenting rules. The paper reveals some important issues calling for attention in the construction project management, especially in setting up the incentive and regulating mechanism.