摘要
本文是关于非正规金融与小额信贷活动研究的一个理论述评。在正规金融活动中,由于信息不对称所导致的逆向选择和道德风险,使得信贷市场无法实现市场出清。在有多余信贷资金的情况下,仍有人得不到贷款。特别是对于广大的低收人人群来说,这种信贷可得性的问题尤为突出。但是,世界各地广泛存在的非正规金融组织,提供了一种有趣的机制,使低收入人群获得信贷支持,使他们的福利水平得到改善。另外,近年来在各个发展中国家建立的小额信贷机构,也是使低收入人群获得信贷支持的一种制度,而且在这些小额信贷机构的运作中,存在着被普遍认为是成功的机制。
This paper theoretically reviews the theory of informal finance and microfinance. In formal financial sectors, there are the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric information, which means that the supply and demand in credit market is not in an equilibrium state. In another word, the credit is not available for some potential borrowers, especially for those low- income ones. However, the world wide informal financial sectors provide interesting mechanisms to provide the access of credit for low - income people and increase their welfare. The emerging of microfinance organizations in developing countries in recent year is another way of providing credit for low - income people. More significantly, these organizations are found to have some successful mechanisms.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第7期123-131,共9页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
中国博士后科学基金(2003033257)的资助
关键词
非正规金融
小额信贷
信息不对称
逆向选择
informal finance,microfinance,asymmetric infonnation, adverse selection