摘要
该文针对中国电力市场中合同市场运行规则的特点,应用猜测供给函数均衡方法模拟发电公司策略行为,并考虑风险规避型的合同电价和现货电价之间的联系,构造了电力公司作为单一购买者和市场运营机构参与重复博弈的电力市场运行时,确定市场统调合同电量占总统调用电量的最佳比例的数学模型,使合同市场能够最大限度地发挥其平抑发电公司所拥有的潜在市场力的作用。通过算例计算分析合同电价的波动、合同电量的分配方案以及市场中电力需求的弹性对统调合同电量所占最佳比例的影响。
In this paper, an approach to determine optimal proportion of centralized contract generation amount in total scheduled load demand is introduced for Chinese primary generation market. It uses the Conjectured Supply Function equilibrium (CSFE) to simulate the strategic behaviors of firms in electricity spot markets, and also takes account of risk-averse relation between contract strike price and spot market clearing price in repeatedly operated electricity market. Numerical results clearly show the relationships among generation amount in contract, market clearing price in spot market and total purchasing cost of single buyer; and the effects of fluctuated contract price, different allocation methods of contract generation amount to individual generators, and elasticity of electricity demand on centralized contract generation.
出处
《中国电机工程学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2004年第7期64-67,共4页
Proceedings of the CSEE
关键词
电力工业
电力市场
电力公司
均衡分析
电价
合同电量
Electric power engineering
Contract generation
Conjectured supply function
Equilibrium theory
Repeated game