摘要
法律诠释学对于法律解释是一种带有先见的理解 ,理解是法律文本与理解者两个世界的沟通 ,在沟通中内在地创造着判决依据的立场 ,试图颠覆法律解释学只是借助各种方法去寻求判决与法律的一致性这一思维定式。然而 ,它放弃法律文本解释的标准、抛开法律文本作者的意图、过于钟爱理解者的主观态度的主张 ,也遭遇有力的批评。所以 ,一是强调内容一是注重方法的这两种法律解释观互不可替代 ,解释无诠释流于空洞 。
Legal hermeneutics, as compared to legal interpretation, is the understanding of the law according to a judge's own attitude. Understanding is the communion between the text of law and the interpreter, in which process the judges internally create the standards of judgment and attempts to overturn the traditional theory of legal interpretation that seeks, with the help of various methods, the identity between judgment and the text of law. However, legal hermeneutics has also been sharply criticized for abandoning the standards of textual interpretation of law, ignoring the intentions of the authors of the text of law, and attaching too much importance to the subjective attitude of the interpreter. Therefore, the two theories on the interpretation of the law, one stressing the content, the other emphasizing the method, are both indispensable. Interpretation without hermeneutics tends to lack in substance whereas hermeneutics without interpretation tends to be blind.
出处
《法学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第3期21-36,共16页
Chinese Journal of Law