摘要
在农业产业化经营过程中 ,龙头企业与农户之间利益的联结方式是采用要素契约还是商品契约 ,不能一概而论 ,而要视具体条件而定。具体而言 :( 1 )如果农户的投资决策是无弹性的 ,则适宜采取要素契约 ;( 2 )如果农户的投资变得相对缺乏生产力 ,则适宜采取要素契约 ;( 3 )如果龙头企业的资产和农户的资产互为独立 ,则适宜采取商品契约 ;( 4 )如果龙头企业经营人员的人力资本是必要的 ,则适宜采取要素契约 ;( 5 )如果龙头企业经营人员的人力资本和农民的人力资本都是必要的 ,则无论采取要素契约或是商品契约都是可行的。若放宽对龙头企业的资金、风险中性等假定 ,龙头企业与农户的联结是采用要素契约还是商品契约 。
In this thesis, a model of Grossman-Hart-Moore is applied to analyze an issue about a choice of contract between an enterprise and a farm in the agricultural industrialization. With a series of assumption and demonstration, some conclusion is reached: in the course of agricultural industrialization, whether the contract of factor or the contract of commodity is suitable to adopt in the link between an enterprise and a farm, is not possibly decided by no condition, but by some concrete conditions. In detail, first of all, if the decision made by a farm in the investment has no elasticity, the contract of factor is suitable to adopt; secondly, if the investment of a farm is relatively lack of productivity, the contract of factor is feasible to take; thirdly, if the asset of an enterprise and the asset of a farm is independent of each other, the contract of commodity is suitable to adopt; fourthly, if the human capital of a manager in an enterprise is essential, the contract of factor is feasible to adopt; and finally, if human capital both in an enterprise and in a farm is necessary, whether the contract of factor or the contract of commodity is feasible. If the assumption about fund and risk preference of an enterprise is broadened, whether the contract of factor or the contract of commodity is adopted will be possibly decided by the desire of an enterprise in the coupling between an enterprise and a farm.
出处
《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第5期13-19,共7页
Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences
关键词
要素契约
商品契约
农业产业化经营
格鲁斯曼-哈特-穆尔模型
contract of factor
contract of commodity
agricultural industrialization
a model of Grossman-Hart-Moore