整车物流中委托代理问题的研究

The Issue of Principal-Agent of Vehicle Logistics

运用信息经济学中的委托代理理论对整车物流过程中汽车生产商和整车物流商之间的信息不对称所引起的委托代理问题进行了分析,从汽车生产商的角度,运用数量模型对整车物流中的委托代理问题进行了推导,结合我国整车物流现状提出了道德风险问题的解决办法。

With the principal-agent theory in information economics, this paper analyses the problem of the principal-agent between the automobile manufacturer and the enterprise of vehicle logistics caused by the information asymmetry. In terms of automobile manufacturer, it explains the question of principal-agent in vehicle logistics by mathematical model, and puts forward solution with the current situation of vehicle logistics in our country to avoid the morals hazard.