信息不对称情况下的VMI协调机制设计

Coordination Mechanism Designing for Vendor Managed Inventory under Asymmetric Information

供应商管理库存(VMI)作为一种基于供应链集成管理思想的新型库存管理模式,有效改善了"双边际 效应"和"长鞭效应"。协调机制设计是VMI研究的新热点。分别分析不合作、集中控制及纯VMI(不包含协调 机制设计)三种供应链结构下的库存补充数量最优解及各方的收益情况;在此基础上研究VMI供应链下的数 量折扣契约协调机制设计;运用委托-代理理论重新设计了当销售价格为不对称信息时的VMI数量折扣契约 设计问题。通过实例仿真,说明在信息不对称下的各方收益变化情况及其对整个系统效率的影响。

As a new kind of inventory management modes, VMI, which bases on integrated management of supply chain management, can improve effectively the double marginal effect and bullwhip effect. Designing the coordination mechanisms is a new hotpoint problem in VMI research field. In this article author firstly deduces the optimum inventory replenishment quantities and profit function of each member under three supply chain contracts: non-coordination, integrated control, and VMI without any coordination mechanisms. After that, quantity discounts contract under VMI supply chain is studied, then VMI quantity discounts contract under asymmetric information of sale price is re-designed by principal-agent theory. Finally, a numeric example illustrates supply chain system inefficiency and profit variety of each member and system.