双重委托代理理论:上市公司治理的另一种分析框架——兼论进一步完善中国上市公司治理的新思路

Double Principal-agent Theory: Another Analysis Framework of Listed Companies' Governance

本文认为西方传统委托代理理论本质上是一种单委托代理理论 ,主要是针对以股权分散为主要特征的上市公司而构建的一种公司治理理论 ,不适合作为以股权相对集中或高度集中为主要特征的上市公司治理问题的分析框架。本文针对以股权相对集中或高度集中为主要特征的上市公司的实际情况 ,在已有的单委托代理理论的基础上 ,提出和构建了一种新的上市公司治理问题分析框架———双重委托代理理论。本文的分析表明 ,对以股权相对集中或高度集中为主要特征的上市公司而言 ,双重委托代理理论比单委托代理理论的解释力更强 ,更有利于实现降低这类公司的双重代理成本和全体股东利益的最大化。本文还依据双重委托代理理论 ,初步探讨了进一步完善中国上市公司治理的基本思路和设想。

This article thinks,essentially, western traditional principal-agent theory is single principal-agent theory. In fact, it is a kind of corporate governance theory built aimed at the listed companies with the main character of diversified equity. Obviously it is not fit for being used as the analysis framework of the governance problem of the listed companies with the main character of the relatively concentrated equity or highly concentrated equity. In term of the actual condition of the listed companies with the main character of relatively concentrated equity or highly concentrated equity, This article puts forward and structures a kind of new analysis framework of listed company's governance problems based on the existing single principal-agent theory——double principal-agent theory. For that matter, the analysis of this article indicates that, for the listed companies with the main character of the relatively concentrated equity or highly concentrated equity, the explaining power of double principal-agent theory is stronger than that of single principal-agent theory. In other words, it is more favorable to reduce the double agency costs of those companies and realize the maximization of all the stockholders' interest of the listed companies. This article, finally, suggests and discusses the threads and designs to further perfect the governance of Chinese listed companies based on the double principal-agent theory.