非对称需求信息条件下的供应链信息共享机制

Supply chain information sharing mechanism under the condition of asymmetric demand information

缺乏有效的信息共享是供应链运作效率低下的主要原因之一,而信息不对称问题广泛存在于供应链之中.面临低市场需求的零售商有可能夸大真实的市场需求以获得更多的产品供应.运用信号传递博弈理论研究了供应链中零售商和供应商之间的共享需求信息的机制,得出了零售商可以通过采购价格向供应商传递真实的市场需求信息的条件,结果表明供应商和零售商之间的信息共享的关键在于分离均衡的存在,分离均衡使得供应商能够得到足够的信息量借以识别零售商的市场预测的真实性.

Without effective sharing of information is one of the main reason that the supply chain operates inefficiently . The information asymmetry problem exists in the supply chain extensively. The retailer facing low market demand has an incentive to inflate his forecast to get more supply. Using the signaling game theory, we investigated the demand information sharing mechanism between retailer and supplier, get the condition under which the retailer could communicate true market demand information to supplier. The result indicates that the key for retailer to share information with supplier is the existence of separating equilibrium, the separating equilibrium let supplier get enough information to identify the credibility of the demand forecast of retailer.