掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

Tunneling, Propping and M&A: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

本文选取我国资本市场 1 998— 2 0 0 1年间发生的 41 6起上市公司收购兼并非上市公司事件为研究样本 ,实证考察了控股股东和地方政府的支持或掏空动机对上市公司长期绩效的影响。结果表明 ,当公司具有配股或避亏动机时进行的购并活动能够在短期内显著提升公司的会计业绩 ,而无保资格之忧时进行的并购活动目的在于掏空资产 ,会损害公司的价值 ,但掏空行为对公司的会计业绩却没有显著影响。

Basing the sample of 416 events in which listed companies merge or acquire non-listed companies in China stock market from 1998 to 2001, this article investigates the effects of tunneling or propping motives of controlling shareholders and local government to the long-term performance of listed companies. The result suggests that the MAs driven by motives of avoiding deficit or rationing shares can enhance the companies' accounting performance in short term. On the other hand, when companies have not such motives, the MAs are basically tunneling activities that will damage the companies' value but have no significant influences to their accounting performance.