互联网骨干网网间直联博弈对管制政策的影响

The Impact of Private Peering Game among Internet Backbone Providers on Regulatory Policy

为了促进互联网的发展和制定出合理的互联政策,本文分析了三个非对称互联网骨干网直联选择博弈。骨干网通过选择与其他骨干网是否直联和设定其接入价格来进行竞争。本文设计了一个两阶段博弈模型对骨干网的直联选择进行分析,同时对三个骨干网的各种直联情景进行比较。从非合作博弈和网络分析两个角度分析了两阶段博弈模型,其中网络分析中引入稳定网络和有效网络的概念。尽管非合作博弈分析得出多个子博弈完美纳什均衡解,但是通过网络分析,稳定和最有效的网络是惟一的,都是全联通图,即三个骨干网两两直联的情景。根据这个结论,对于网络资源相差不大的骨干网网间直联,规制部门只需对骨干网网间的合谋行为进行监管,以防止企业的反竞争行为,不必对骨干网网间直联进行监管;而对于网络资源相差较大的骨干网网间直联,规制部门需对互联互通质量进行监管。

The paper examined the model from two alternative modeling perspectives-a purely non-cooperative game and a network theoretic perspective,where pairwise stable and efficient networks were examined.While there are a large number of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria through a purely non-cooperative game,both the pairwise stable and the most efficient network resource difference,the regulatory department only need to regulate the collusion to avoid anti-competitive behaviours and need not regulate private peering.For the interconnection among IBPs of the comparatively larger network resource difference,the regulatory department must regulate interconnection quality.