国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费

Regulation and Non-pecuniary Compensation in Chinese SOEs

本文从我国国有企业中存在薪酬管制这一特殊制度背景出发,对上市公司高管人员在职消费行为进行理论分析,并对在职消费的主要影响因素与薪酬管制的经济后果进行了实证检验。经验证据表明,我国上市公司在职消费主要受企业租金、绝对薪酬和企业规模等因素的影响;由于薪酬管制的存在,在职消费成为国有企业管理人员的替代性选择,说明在职消费内生于国有企业面临的薪酬管制约束;与民营企业中内生于公司的薪酬契约相比,国有企业中受到管制的外生薪酬安排缺乏应有的激励效率。

Based on the special institutional settings that there exists the regulation on managerial compensation in chinese SOEs, we examine the determinants of non-pecuniary compensation and the economic consequences of regulation on compensation. The empirical evidences show that non-pecuniary compensation is influenced by firm rents, absolute pay and firm size. Due to regulation on cash compensation in SOEs, non-pecuniary compensation is an alternative choice for managers. And, the regulated compensation contract lacks of economic efficiency.