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浙江发电侧电力市场发电商的电价操纵行为分析 被引量:4

Electricity Price Manipulation Behavior of Power Producers in Power Market at Generation Side in Zhejiang Province
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摘要 电力市场成员能利用自身的市场力影响电力市场正常运作。利用经济学和博弈论的分析方 法,并结合浙江省发电侧电力市场的实际运行数据和经验,具体分析了市场成员的市场力形成原因 及其影响市场运作的过程。文中分析了市场中单一购电商的需求特性,得出了发电商的最佳报价 模型,分析了不同发电商的报价行为,指出大型发电商通过对电网中旋转备用的分担,容易操纵市 场价格,中小型发电商也可以通过跟踪大型发电商的报价参与抬高市场价格,从而降低整个市场的 效率。最后,提出了相应的建议措施。 The members of the power market can manipulate the electricity price by its own market power. By combining the actual operation data and experience in the power market of Zhejiang Province, the economics theory and game theory methods are applied to search the reasons of how the market power being produced and how it influences the price. The demand characteristics of single power purchaser are analyzed to educe the power producer's ideal bid model. The different bidding behaviors of different power producers are also analyzed. It's concluded that the large-scale power producers can manipulate the market price by sharing the reserve capacity, and others can take part in enhancing the price by imitating the bid of the large-scale producers, thus the efficiency of the whole market is lowered. Finally, some corresponding suggestions are given.
作者 李道强
出处 《电力系统自动化》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2005年第6期29-34,共6页 Automation of Electric Power Systems
关键词 清算电价 竞价机组 旋转备用 寡头垄断市场 Costs Electric industry Game theory Industrial economics
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参考文献4

  • 1浙江省电力公司.浙江电网发电市场规则[Z].,2000..
  • 2PETERSENHC LEWISWC 吴德庆译.管理经济学(第3版)[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000..
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