“逆向软预算约束”:一个政府行为的组织分析

Inverted Soft Budget Constraint: Extrabudgetary Resource-Seeking in Local Governments

本文以“逆向软预算约束”概念概括基层政府自上而下地向所管辖区域中的下属组织和个人索取资源的行为,并从组织分析角度探讨这类现象产生的渊源:在微观层次上,干部晋升制度的机制和信息不对称导致了基层政府官员追求资源密集型政绩工程的短期利益,为不断突破已有预算约束、追求预算外资源的政府行为提供了激励;在宏观层次上,组织制度自上而下的约束机制由于上下级政府官员的共同利益联合而难以有效运行,自下而上的企业或个人的抵制活动因组织程度的不对称而无法奏效,而权、责、利三位一体在实际运行中的分离导致责任目标制度的失败。因此,宏观组织制度难以对政府官员的行为实行有效约束。

In contrast to the “Soft Budget Constraint” syndrome found in socialist economies, in this study I develop the concept of “Inverted Soft Budget Constraint” to describe and explain widespread government behavior in recent years in which local governments seek to disregard the fixed budget constraint imposed from above by mobilizing and extracting resources from below—from firms, subordinate agencies, and individuals within their precincts. Local governments' behavior associated with the “Inverted Soft Budget Constraint” phenomenon takes a variety of forms: the imposition of extra fees and taxes and the use of political pressure or positive incentives to demand that local enterprises sponsor government-initiated projects. The analytical model developed in this study shows that several mechanisms instituted in the reform of the Chinese bureaucracy have inadvertently induced these behaviors. At the micro-level, promotion policies and information asymmetry in the Chinese bureaucracy induce local government officials to invest in short-term goals and to engage in resource-intensive “achievement projects” to signal their ability and performance, thereby creating strong incentives for local governments to expand beyond existing budget constraints. At the macro-level, the institutional environment, authority relationships in the Chinese bureaucracy, and the monopolistic role of local governments have undermined institutional constraints on, and indeed often encourage, the behaviors that reproduce and perpetuate the “inverted soft budget constraint” phenomenon.