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考虑佣金的关联价值拍卖模型 被引量:11

Affiliated value model considering effect of commission
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摘要 在标准的只考虑买卖双方的拍卖模型中引入第三方,拍卖公司.拍卖公司提供服务要收取一定的佣金,佣金费用由买家支付,支付额占成交价的比例为k.文章发现,佣金比例k的大小对买卖双方均有一定影响:买方的出价策略变得谨慎但是其均衡期望收益却与k无关;卖方的期望收益受到影响而降低.事实上,拍卖公司的佣金就是来自于卖方的期望收益中.文中就第一价格与第二价格机制在关联价值模型上讨论佣金问题,得到的结果有较普遍的意义. The auction company is induced as a third side in standard auction model which considers only bidders and seller. The auction company takes some commission from the winner of the auction. The main result is that the volume of the commission rate k has both effects on the bidder's bid strategy and the expected profits of the seller: bidder's bid becomes more passive but its expected profits is not dependent on the commission rate k; the seller's expected profit has really decreased. In fact, the commission obtained by auctioneer comes from the profit of the seller. With the affiliated value model that induced commission, this paper considers the strategy in the first_price auction and second_price auction.
作者 毕志伟 王彦
出处 《管理科学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第3期24-27,80,共5页 Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70071012).
关键词 拍卖 佣金比例 均衡期望收益 auction commission rate equilibrium expected revenue
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参考文献17

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共引文献68

同被引文献104

引证文献11

二级引证文献37

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