供应链内部的折扣博弈

Rebate Games between the Supplier and the Retailer in a Two-Stage Supply Chain with Revenue-Sharing Contract

供应链内部的折扣博弈是供应链系统中的一个常见问题,供应商的品牌力度,零售商的网络规模都是决定博弈中议价能力的主要因素,本文将品牌力度从降价促销所带来的品牌销量中分离出来。构建模型衡量各个因素在决定议价能力时所起的作用。并由模型的结果分析了由于信息不对称所导致的“品牌退出”的逆向选择现象。

Deciding the rebate between the supplier and the retailer in a two - stage supply chain is a common problem. Supplier＇ s brand and retailer＇ s network scale are the two main factors in deciding bargaining power. In this paper, a model containing these two and other important factors is developed and analyzed. Furthermore, a kind of adverse selection resulted from asymmetry information is extended from the result of the model.