摘要
文章从信息不对称的角度,通过对斯宾塞劳动力市场模型的发展,建立了一个针对高学历“追逐症”与失业的博弈模型,并对此进行了均衡和福利分析。分析结果表明,信息不对称是高学历“追逐症”和高学历人才失业问题的重要成因,降低高能力者受教育的成本、提高劳动力市场和教育市场的竞争度以及使学校教育更切合生产实际,能有效缓解高学历追逐和失业问题,减少社会教育资源无效消耗和社会效用损失。
Establishing a model based on Spenee's Job Market Signaling Model, this paper probes into the higher education chasing and unemployment problem. The result indicates that information asymmetry is the important reason for this problem. By decreasing educational cost of high aptitude people,enhancing the competition of job market and educational market and integrating school education with practice, this problem could be mitigated and the loss of educational resource and social utilities could be reduced as well.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第1期113-120,共8页
Journal of Finance and Economics
关键词
高学历
追逐症
失业
博弈均衡
Higher education chasing
unemployment
equilibrium of game