股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响

Ownership Concentration,Outside Blockholders,and Operating Performance:Evidence from China's Listed Companies

在对大股东的性质作出清晰界定的基础上,本文考察了中国上市公司的股权集中度和股权制衡情况及其对公司经营绩效的影响。研究发现:股权集中度和经营绩效之间有着显著的正向线性关系,而且这种关系在不同性质的控股股东中都是存在的。具体来说,在中央直属国有企业和私有产权控股的上市公司中股权集中度所表现的激励程度最高,地方所属国有企业控股的上市公司次之,而国有资产管理机构控股的上市公司最低。同时,过高的股权制衡程度对公司的经营绩效有负面影响。但是,不同性质外部大股东的作用效果有明显差别,而且其在不同性质控股股东控制的上市公司中的表现也不尽一致。

By identifying the types of bloekholders, this study investigates the ownership concentration, outside blockholders and their effects on operating performance for china＇ s listed companies. We find that, there is a linear, rather than a nonlinear relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration, and the positive association holds for all groups. Therefore incentive effect, not entrenchment effect, exists for the largest shareholders. Particularly, the positive effect is highest in the listed companies controlled by SOEs affiliated to the central government （SOECGs） and by private entities; is in-between in the listed companies controlled by SOEs affiliated to the local government （SOELGs） ; is lowest in the listed companies controlled by state asset-management bureaus （SAMB）. In the meantime, having outside blockholders is generally associated with lower firm performance ; however, the effects of various outside blockholders on firm performance, and these effects in various types of listed companies are significantly different.