第三方物流服务分包管理中的质量博弈行为研究

Quality Game Behavior in Thirdparty Logistics Service Subcontract Management

第三方物流提供者在整合、调度社会资源为第三方物流需求方服务时,如何管理、控制分包商的运作质量,使之符合第三方物流服务需求方的质量标准,从第三方物流提供者与分包商的质量博弈行为出发,构建了第三方物流服务分包管理中质量博弈的Nash均衡模型、Stackelberg均衡模型和合作博弈模型。在对三种博弈结构进行比较后发现,尽管合作博弈均衡下的渠道总收益最大,但与Nash均衡博弈结构相比,第三方物流提供者更愿意采取Stackelberg博弈结构,而只有在一定条件下分包商才会选择Stackelberg博弈结构;同时,第三方物流提供者在合作博弈结构中的质量投入比在Stackelberg博弈结构中要大,但在一定条件下,合作博弈结构中的第三方物流提供者质量投入比在Nash均衡博弈结构中的要少。

This paper analyzes the problem of contrulling the subcontractor service quality, making it accordance with the quality standard of thirdparty logisties service demander, proposes tile thirdparty logistics service quality subcontract models of Nash equilibriunl model, Stackelberg equilibriunl game and Cooperate game, which focus on the quality policy made by the thirdparty logisties supplier and subcontractor. After the comparison of these three game models, the paper concludes that thirdparty logistics provider prefer to the Staekelberg equilibrium model, while subcontractor wouht rather choose the Stackelberg equilibrium model than the Nash equilibrium model just on some conditions; meanwhile, the quality investment under the Cooperate game model is greater than that is under the Stackelberg equilibrium model, but it is less than that is under the Nash equilibrium model on some conditions.