委托—代理关系下第三方物流中的激励机制研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism in Third Party Logistics Under the Principal-agent Theory

根据委托代理理论,模型化第三方物流中物流服务外包方与物流服务提供商之间的委托代理关系,分析了第三方物流中由于信息不对称而产生的道德风险问题及其激励机制设计问题。并通过对物流服务外包方代理成本和物流服务提供商激励报酬强度系数影响因素的进一步分析,指出构建物流服务提供商激励机制必须反映物流服务提供商的特质、外部环境条件的变化以及外包方代理成本等因素的影响。

According to principal-agent theory, the paper analyzes the principal-agent problems in the third party logistics such as moral hazard and incentive mechanism designing owing to the asymmetric information, and gives the model of principal-agent relationship between the outsourcer and the logistics service provider. Furthermore, the papers analyzes the agent costs of outsourcer and incentive remuneration intensity coefficient of provider and points out that the designing of incentive mechanism for provider must reflect the influences of provider＇ specialty, the change of external environment and the agent costs of outsourcer.