摘要
本文以2001-2003年非金融性A股公司为样本,实证研究了大股东对公司投资的影响,并检验了这种影响的原因和作用过程。研究结果发现:(1)上市公司的投资与现金流显著正相关;(2)第一大股东持股比例与投资-现金流敏感度之间呈显著的负相关关系;(3)当第一大股东是国家时,负相关系数更大,当第一大股东是境内社会法人时,负相关关系不显著; (4)实证表明“过度投资”是中国上市公司投资的典型表现,这不仅符合“自由现金流假说”的推断,而且可以用“信息不对称理论”中“融资约束”相反的“融资便利”来加以解释。
This paper using dada spanning the 2001-2003 years of China's non-financial A Stock listed companies, we empirically investigate how large shareholders' ownership influence a firm's investment-cash flow sensitivity; and we evaluate the cause and the process of their relationship. The results are as follows. First, investment of listed companies is significantly and positively affected by cash flow. Second, large shareholders' holdings are negatively related with investment-cash flow sensitivity. Third, when large shareholders' are state, the negative coefficient is great; when they are legal within country's borders, the negative relationship is not significant. Finally, the reason for investment-cash flow sensitivity and the influence of large shareholders on investment-cash flow sensitivity is more likely to be overinvestment hypotheses.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
2006年第5期67-73,共7页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目资助(70272045)
关键词
股权结构
大股东
过度投资
投资-现金流敏感度
Ownership Structure
Large Shareholders
Over-investment
Investment-cash Flow Sensitivity