企业终极所有者“掏空”行为的影响因素

Influential Factors to Tunneling of Ultimate owner in Private Pyramid Firms

运用我国2001-2005民营上市公司的非平衡面板数据，考察了民营金字塔结构下终极所有者掏空底层公司的影响因素。研究发现：在保证控制权的情况下，终极所有者所持有的现金流权越小，其对企业的掏空越严重；处于金字塔底层的公司资产利润率越低，终极所有者越倾向于对其进行掏空；投资者保护越差，越有利于终极所有者的掏空行为。相反，在投资者保护较好的企业，即使终极所有者的现金流权较小，即使其资产收益率较低，也不会发生严重的掏空行为。

The paper analyzes the influential factors to tunneling of ultimate owner in private pyramid firms using the unbalanced panel data of Chinese private listed firms from 2001 to 2005. The result suggests that the small of the cash-flow right owned by controlling minority shareholder or the lower ROA of the under layer firm or the worse protection of investors, the more severely tunneling to outside shareholder. Even of the small of cash flow right owned by controlling minority shareholder or the lower ROA of the under layer firm, the controlling minority shareholder will not made severely tunneling when the firm under better investors legal protection environment.