摘要
本文以新制度经济学的路径依赖理论和博弈论作为分析框架,对政府治理形态嬗变过程中存在的路径依赖现象和地方政府不合作博弈现象进行深入的学理分析,进而提出打破恶性路径依赖和不合作博弈困境的引导性对策。
This article the Path Dependence theory and Game Theory in the New Institutional Economics are taken as the scientific analysis frame to probe into the phenomenon of path dependence in process of administration vicissitude of government formation and the phenomenon of non - cooperation among various regional governments. Furthermore, it tends to propose the guidance countermeasure to break malignant path dependence and the difficult position of game.
出处
《中国行政管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第3期99-102,共4页
Chinese Public Administration
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目"社会主义政治文明建设与中国特色权力监督机制研究"(编号05AZZ002)
江苏省六大人才高峰资助项目"沿江开发与行政区域协调发展"的成果之一
关键词
区域公共管理
行政区行政
路径依赖
博弈
Regional public administration
Administration in administrative area
Path dependence
Game.
