财政分权、地方政府竞争与FDI的增长效应

Fiscal Decentralization, Competition between Local Governments, and the Economic Growth of FDI

中国的财政分权体制与西方联邦国家的不同,财政分权导致中国各个地方政府围绕经济指标为追求政绩而进行锦标赛式的竞争。财政分权程度越大,地方政府竞争辖区外流动性要素的程度就越大。以对FDI的竞争为例,由于各地区经济发展不平衡,东部地区地方政府是一种全方位的深层次竞争,中西部地区仅在税收优惠和增加财政支出方面具有明显效果。进一步的实证结果表明,财政分权导致的地方政府对FDI的激烈竞争,在东中部地区不利于FDI发挥增长效应,在西部地区则得出相反的结果。本文认为应及时改革现行的财政分权制度和对地方政府的考核激励机制,才能更好地发挥FDI的增长效应。

The fiscal authority decentralization in China, different from that in Western federal countries, has led to the fact that the local governments have tried to win something like a championship for achievements in hitting economic targets. The greater the degree of this decentralization, the more sharply the local governments contest for fluid economic resources outside areas under their administration. Take the competition for FDI. Owing to the imbalance in economic growth between China's eastern areas and center-western areas, the local governments of the eastern areas vie in the profound depths and all-sidedly, while those of center and western areas can only achieve good and obvious results in tax preference and in increase in fiscal expenditure. Our case study further indicates that the local governments' sharp contest resulted from the fiscal decentralization in the east and center areas has been detrimental to the effect of FDI on economic growth, and that the reverse is truth in the west areas. In our opinion, we should timely reform China's existing system of fiscal decentralization, in order to make FDI play a better role in the promotion of economic growth.