逆向选择条件下技术许可中非排他性价格契约研究

Study on the Nonexclusive Price Contracts of Technology Licensing Under the Conditions of Adverse Selection

通过经典的委托代理理论的应用,文章揭示了一类逆向选择条件下的技术许可中非排他性价格契约理论的内在机理。文章认为,通过针对差的类型的技术使用者的包含可变费用的契约和对好的类型的技术使用者的纯固定费用的契约,可以达到有效的排他性技术许可的目的;但为了有效的激励,技术所有者事前要对好的类型的技术使用者转移一定的信息租。

Through the application of the classical principal-agent theory, this paper unveils the internal mechanism of the non-exclusive price contracts of technology licensing under the conditions of adverse selection. It shows that the licensor can license a non-exclusive technology through royalty contracts for the bad-type licensee and the pure fixed fee contracts for the good-type licensee. But in order for an incentive to be effective, the licensor must pay some information rent for the good licensee.