信号成本与服务外包供应商信号传递关系的博弈模型

A Game Model on the Relations between Signal Cost and Outsourcing Vendor Signaling

由于服务外包市场的信息不对称性和不完美性,外包商难以清楚了解供应商的能力,使得服务外包供应商选择市场出现逆向选择。为解决非对称信息条件下服务外包供应商选择市场运行的低效问题,本文利用信号博弈建立了信号成本与外包供应商信号传递关系的数学模型,并通过案例分析说明了该模型对管理的指导意义。

Because of asymmetric information and imperfect information,it is difficult for outsourcer to clarify the ability of the vendor which usually results in adverse selection. To solve such a problem,a model for analyzing the impacts of asymmetric information on vendor selection is proposed. Furthermore, the condition for market success is given based on the signal cost of vendor and the belief of outsoureer in this paper. At last, a ease analysis is presented to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the model on management significance.