平等与增长携手并进——收益递增、策略性行为和分工的效率损失

Equality and Growth Hand in Hand: Increasing Returns, Strategic Behavior and Efficiency Loss in the Division of Labor

本文中的策略性劳动分工模型解释了为什么人们有时不选择分工，并造成社会产出损失。由于在高技能部门里存在“干中学”效应，低技能者如果背离比较优势而从事高技能部门的生产，就可以在未来分享劳动分工收益的过程中获得更高的谈判地位，甚至可能逆转自己的比较优势。然而，这种个人理性的选择却可能导致社会的产出损失。这个模型的一个意外而合理的含义是，在策略性的劳动分工决策中，如果未来一期由交易关系瓦解而造成的损失足够小，那么，交易成本的减少也可能导致当期分工的恶化。但我们的模型也包含了交易成本下降可能促进分工这一既有理论中的特殊情况。这个模型有助于理解在国际贸易、国内区域间分工和家庭内分工中广泛被观察到的低效率现象及相应的政策。

The strategic labor division model in this paper explains why people sometimes choose not to specialize despite social losses. With the learning-by-doing effects in the high- skill sector, the unskilled, if he does not specialize himself currently, can gain higher bargain- ing position in sharing the future benefits of labor division, and even reverse his comparative advantage. However, this individually rational decision might result in social losses in pro- duction. One striking, but reasonable, implication of the model is that the reduction in transaction costs does not necessarily lead to specialization in strategic labor division, if the loss due to the ending of the current partnership is low enough. Our model includes the existing theories as a special case. This model sheds light on why inefficiency is widely observed in international trade, within-country interregional specialization, and intrahousehold labor division.